axioms of arithmetic are derivable, in second-order logic, from Hume's Principle. That is to say: The main theorem of Grundgesetze, which George Boolos has rightly urged us to call Frege's Theorem, is that Hume's Principle implies the axioms of second-order arithmetic.
That Frege offered proofs of the axioms of arithmetic in Grundgesetze is well-known, even if the fact that he proved Frege's Theorem has not been. However, only one-third of Part II of Grundgesetze, entitled "Proofs of the Basic Laws of Number", is concerned with the proofs of these axioms. The remainder of Part II contains proofs of a number of additional results, among them Theorem 167, that there is an infinite cardinal (namely, the number of natural numbers); Theorem 359, of which the least number principle is an instance; and Theorem 469, the main theorem required for the definition of addition. Of interest to us here is Theorem 263.
To state Theorem 263 and the form of Hume's Principle which Frege employs in his proof of it, we need a number of definitions. These definitions, and the theorems themselves, I give in translation into second-order logic. The first is that of the converse of a relation (Gg I §39): Thus, a relation R maps a concept F into a concept G just in case R is functional and every F stands in it to some (and therefore exactly one) G. 7 Using these definitions, Frege concisely formulates Hume's Principle as:
Nx:Fx = Nx:Gx iff (R)[Map(R)(F,G) & Map(Conv R)(G,F)]
This formulation is equivalent to the more familiar formulation given above, but it has certain technical advantages over it. Nx:Gx = Suppose that there is a relation Q which satisfies the following conditions: First, it is functional; second, no object follows after itself in the Q-series; thirdly, each G stands in the Q-relation to some object; and, finally, the Gs are the members of the Q-series beginning with some object. Then, says
Theorem 263, the number of Gs is Endlos.
Frege's Proof of Theorem 263
It is worth quoting Frege's initial explanation of Theorem 263 in full: 11 We now prove...that Endlos is the number which belongs to a concept, if the objects falling under this concept may be ordered in a series, which begins with a particular object and continues without end, without coming back on itself and without branching.
By an "unbranching series", Frege means one whose determining relation is functional; by a series which does not "come back on itself", he means one in which no object follows after itself; by a series which "continues without end", he means one every member of which is immediately followed by some object.
What it is essential to show is that Endlos is the number which belongs to the concept member of such a series.... For this purpose, we use proposition (32) and have to establish that there is a relation which maps the number-series into the Q-series beginning with x, and whose converse maps the latter into the former.
Proposition (32) is one direction of Hume's Principle, namely: If there is a relation which maps the Fs into the Gs and whose converse maps the Gs into the Fs, then the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs.
It suggests itself to associate 0 with x, 1 with the next member of the Q-series following after x, and so always to associate the number following next with the member of the Qseries following next. Each time, we combine a member of the number-series and a member of the Q-series into a pair, and we build a series from these pairs.
That is, the theorem is to be proven by defining, by induction, a relation 12 between the numbers and the members of the Q-series beginning with x: The number, n, which is the immediate successor of a given number, m, will be related to that member of Q-series, call it x n , which follows immediately after the member of the Q-series to which m is related, say, x m : 0 1 2 ... m n ...
The proof of the theorem will require a proof of the validity of such definitions. The idea is to define the relation by defining a series of ordered pairs: Namely, the series <0;x 0 >, <1;x 1 >, etc. The relation will then hold between objects x and y just in case <x;y> is a member of this series of ordered pairs; as one might put it, the members of this series will be the extension of the relation to be defined. To define this series of ordered pairs, Frege thus needs to introduce ordered pairs into his system and to define the relation in which a given member of the series stands to the next member of the series.
Unfortunately, Frege's definition of ordered pairs is, as George Boolos once put it, extravagant and can not be consistently reconstructed, either in second-order logic or in set-theory. According to
Frege's definition, the ordered pair (a;b) is the class to which all and only the extensions of relations in which a stands to b belong. Obviously, this is a (super-)proper class. Frege's proof can, however, be carried out if we take ordered pairs as primitive and subject to the usual ordered pair axiom:
Indeed, Frege derives OP from his definition, 13 and the fact that ordered pairs, so defined, satisfy OP is all he really uses (just as the fact that numbers satisfy Hume's Principle is all he uses).
14 After introducing ordered pairs, Frege continues by defining the relation in which a given member of his series of pairs stands to the next: 15 The series-forming relation is thereby determined: a pair stands in it to a second pair, if the first member of the first pair stands in the Pred-relation to the first member of the second pair, and the second member of the first pair stands in the Q-relation to the second member of the second pair. If, then, the pair (n;y) belongs to our series beginning with the pair (0;x), then n stands to y in the mapping relation to be exhibited.
That is to say: (m;n) will stand in the "series-forming relation" to (x;y) just in case Pred(m,n) and Qxy.
Frege goes on to define this relation for the general case:
...For the...relation, which, in the way given above, is, as I say, coupled from the Rrelation and the Q-relation, I introduce a simple sign, by defining: and that its converse maps the latter into the former. Thus, in terms of ordered pairs and his definition of the coupling of two relations, Frege is able explicitly to define a relation which correlates the Gs one-toone with the natural numbers.
Frege's Use of Ordered Pairs
As said, Frege's proof of Theorem 263 can be carried out in Fregean Arithmetic, if we add the ordered pair axiom to it. More interestingly, however, the proof can also be carried out in Fregean Arithmetic itself.
Frege introduces ordered pairs for two reasons. First, he uses them to give his definition of the coupling of two relations. The use of ordered pairs is obviously inessential to this definition, which can instead be given as:
Secondly, as we saw, the relation which is to correlate the natural numbers one-one with the Gs is defined by Frege as:
Thus, Frege uses ordered pairs in order to be able to use the ancestral--which is the ancestral of a twoplace relation--to define this new relation. Given our definition of (RQ)(,;, ), it is a four-place relation, so we can not apply Frege's definition of the ancestral.
As mentioned, Frege essentially uses nothing about ordered pairs in his proofs other than that they satisfy the ordered pair axiom: Indeed, much of his effort is devoted to eliminating reference to ordered pairs from certain of his theorems. A particularly nice example is an instance of induction for series determined by the couplings of relations. The definition of the strong ancestral yields the following, Frege's Theorem 123:
Taking Q to be (R,Q)(,); a to be (a;b); b to be (c;d); we have:
Here, the bound variables will range, for all intents and purposes, over ordered pairs, since the domain and range of (R,Q)(,) consist only of ordered pairs; F, in turn, will be a concept under which ordered pairs fall. Let us define the concept Col (F)()--the collapse of F--to be that concept under which an ordered pair (x;y) stands just in case Fxy. Formally:
We then substitute Col(F)() for F to get (*):
Consider, now, the third conjunct of (*):
What we wish to show is that this conjunct follows from:
We suppose that (R, Similarly, the second conjunct of (*) follows from:
Thus, applying these two results and the definition of 'Col(F)()' to (*), we have:
This is Frege's Theorem 231, and it is one of the forms of induction he uses in his proof of Theorem 263.
Note that all reference to ordered pairs has been eliminated, except in the first conjunct, where it is needed for the application of the ancestral.
Frege is thus using ordered pairs to define a two-place relation, (R,Q)(,), from a four-place 
Definition by Induction
We now return to the proof of Theorem 263. I shall discuss only parts of Frege's proof here, namely, those parts which are of some conceptual interest. Those parts of the proof which proceed primarily by brute force (i.e., by repeated applications of the ancestral) will be omitted.
Recall that Theorem 263 is:
The Theorem follows immediately from Frege's Theorem 262, which is:
Two pieces of terminology. If Q is functional and no object follows after itself in the Q-series, let us say that the Q-series is simple. If every member of the Q-series beginning with a stands in the Q-relation to some object, let us say that the Q-series beginning with a is endless. Theorem 262 thus says that, if the Q-series is simple and if the Q-series beginning with a is endless, then the number of members of the Qseries beginning with a is Endlos.--Theorem 263 then follows, since the number of Gs is certainly Endlos if the Gs are the members of the Q-series beginning with a.
Hence, the Theorem follows from the definition of Endlos and Frege's Theorem 262,:
This Theorem is to be proven, as Frege indicates in the remarks quoted above, by showing that, if the antecedent holds, then there is a relation which maps the natural numbers into the members of the Qseries beginning with a and whose converse maps the latter concept into the former. Recall that (RQ)(,) is the coupling of the relations R and Q, which is defined as:
The mapping relation is then to be: We turn, then, to the proof of Theorem 262,, which is, again:
Frege's proof of this Theorem requires three lemmas, the first of which is Theorem 254: correlates the natural numbers one-to-one with the members of the Q-series beginning with a. Now, Q is functional and the Q-series beginning with a is endless. So, ^(Pred Q; 0,a)(,) maps the natural numbers into the members of the Q-series beginning with a, by Theorem 256. Moreover, if, in Theorem 254, we take Q as Pred(,), R as Q, m as a, and a as 0, then we have:
The antecedent holds, since, by hypothesis, Q is functional and no object follows after itself in the Qseries (a fortiori, no member of the Q-series beginning with a does); moreover, Pred(,) is functional 
It is this theorem which justifies the definition of a function(al relation), defined on the natural numbers, by induction. For, eliminating 'Map' via the definition, we have:
If Q is functional and the Q-series beginning with a is endless, then ^(Pred Q; 0,a)(,) is functional and every natural number is in its domain. Moreover, it is not difficult to see that its range consists entirely of members of the Q-series beginning with a.
18
Theorem 256 is thus a version of what is known as the recursion theorem for . The usual settheoretic statement of this theorem is:
Let g() be a function, g: A A; let a A. Then there is a unique function : A such that (0) = a and (n+1) = g((n)).
Assume the antecedent and define Q [ = g()]. Q is then functional, since g() is a function, and the Q-series beginning with a is endless, as can easily be seen. Thus, the antecedent of Theorem 256 is satisfied, so ^(Pred Q; 0,a)(,) is functional and its domain contains all the natural numbers.
Uniqueness is obvious.
It is not hard to see that this relation satisfies the recursion equations. We must show that ^(Pred Q; 0,a)(0,a), that is, that (0) = a. And, we must show that ^(Pred Q; 0,a)(n+1,g(x)), if hence, ^(Pred Q; 0,a)(n+1,g(x)), by definition.
As an example, consider the recursion equations:
(S here is the successor-function.) As above, we define Q as = S; thus, Q is just Pred(,). 
The Definition of Relations by Induction
We now turn to the proof of the central lemma in Frege's proof of Theorem 263, Theorem 254.
(The proof of Theorem 259 is not difficult and will be omitted.) Recall that Theorem 254 is: (namely, those mentioned in Theorem 253), the relation so defined will be functional. 24 An example should help to explain the theorem. Let Q relate m to n just in case n is a prime multiple of m; that is, define:
Now, it is a theorem of arithmetic that, for every natural number m1, there is some n such that Qmn: holds just in case x is a product of m (not necessarily distinct) primes, as can easily be seen.
25
The proof of Theorem 241, itself is of no great interest and will be omitted.
Functionality and the n-Ancestral
We turn then to the proof of Frege's Theorem 253, for which we need two lemmas. Recall that Theorem 253 is:
The first of the lemmas, Theorem 252, is essentially:
That is: If R and Q are functional, then (RQ)(,;, ) is functional. However, since the notion of functionality has so far been defined only for two-place relations, the consequent is not yet well-formed. Now, for Frege, the coupling of two relations is a relation between ordered pairs, whence it is indeed a two-place relation: To say that (RQ) [,] is functional is then to say that:
Since 'x' and 'y' here range over ordered pairs, we may, as earlier, reduce this proposition to:
xyzwuv[(RQ)[(x;y), (z;w)] & (RQ)[(x;y), (u;v)] z=u & w=v]
We therefore define: That is: A four-place relation R,;, is 2,2-functional if, and only if, whenever the pair of x and y stands in it to the pair of z and w and to the pair of u and v, the pair of z and w is the pair of u and v. We may then write Theorem 252 as:
The second needed lemma is Theorem 248: That is: If R is functional and both t and n belong to the R-series beginning with m, then either n belongs to the R-series beginning with t or t follows after n in the R-series. It is this theorem which will imply that any object which "occurs twice" in the R-series beginning with m follows after itself in the Rseries.
What we need is in fact not Theorem 243, but its analogue for the 2-ancestral, Theorem 243 2 : The proofs of the lemmas are not difficult and, except for that of Theorem 243 2 (which is in Appendix II), will be omitted.
Theorem 263 in the Context of Frege's Development of Arithmetic
We have thus completed our discussion of Frege's proof of Theorem 263. As we have seen, the proof can be reconstructed in Fregean Arithmetic, with or without the use of the ordered pair axiom.
Moreover, Frege's proofs of the crucial Theorems 254 and 259, of which the Isomorphism Theorem is an immediate consequence, can be reconstructed in second-order logic, either with or without the use of the ordered pair axiom. Since Frege was perfectly aware that his uses of Axiom V in such proofs are dispensible, 28 Frege did, in effect, prove Theorem 263 in Fregean Arithmetic, augemented by the ordered pair axiom, and the Isomorphism Theorem in second-order logic, augmented by the ordered pair axiom. I have suggested, further, that Frege knew his use of ordered pairs to be dispensible and so knew, and effectively showed, these also to be theorems of second-order arithmetic and logic simpliciter.
The significance of Theorem 263, in the context of Frege's project, is far from clear, however;
Frege does not say very much about it. In the Introduction, for example, he writes:
It might be thought that the propositions concerning the number 'Endlos' could have been omitted; to be sure, they are not necessary for the foundation of arithmetic in its traditional compass, but their derivation is for the most part simpler than that of the corresponding propositions for finite numbers and can serve as preparation for it (Gg p.
v).
But, surely, the Theorem is of greater significance than that: Grundgesetze is not just a random collection of results, and it is implausible in the extreme that Frege should have included the proof of Theorem 263
in what was intended to be his magnum opus just because it is similar to, and simpler than, the proof of a corresponding result for finite numbers. That is: If the number of Gs is Endlos and every F is a G, then, either the number of Fs is Endlos or the number of Fs is finite; i.e., every concept subordinate to a concept whose number is countably infinite is countable. This result is of some importance, but its significance is not immediately apparent either.
31
The real point of Theorem 263, it seems to me, is not revealed by examination of its use in
Grundgesetze.
A modern reader would naturally take the theorem--or, more generally, the Isomorphism Theorem--to show that any two structures satisfying certain conditions are isomorphic. Recall that the Isomorphism Theorem is: The conditions in question are thus:
Earlier, we called a series whose determining relation satisfies these conditions a simply endless series and said that the Isomporphism Theorem shows that all simply endless series are isomorphic. Better to understand the significance of this Theorem, let us write the conditions slightly differently. We write '0'
for 'a' and introduce a concept N, as in Theorem 263:
Conditions (1)- (4) are axioms for arithmetic: The more familiar Dedekind-Peano Axioms are easily derived from them (and conversely). 32 What the proof of Theorem 263 shows is thus that any two structures satisfying Frege's axioms for arithmetic are isomorphic.
As was said, that Frege so intended the proof can not be shown by quoting him: He is not very good about explaining the significance of the theorems he proves. There is nevertheless reason to think that he did so intend it: Namely, the hypothesis that the proof is to show that any structures satisfying these axioms for arithmetic are isomorphic resolves an annoying puzzle about the structure of Part II of Grundgesetze. What is puzzling is the status accorded to the proof that no natural number follows itself in the Pred-series: This theorem is granted its very own section, advertised as a major result. The modern reader, with the Dedekind-Peano Axioms firmly in mind, naturally reads it as but an important lemma in the proof that every natural number has a successor. But Frege accords it pride of place: For it is among his axioms for arithmetic.
It is worth noting, too, that Frege's axioms are extremely intuitive. The natural numbers are the members of a series which begins with the number zero (Axiom 4, induction); each number in this series is followed by one (Axiom 3, that every natural number has a successor) and exactly one number (Axiom 1, that Pred(,) is functional). And, so to speak, each number in the series is followed by a new number, by one which has not previously occurred in the series: That is, the successor of a natural number never precedes it in the number-series. Formally:
As is easily seen, however, in the presence of the other axioms, this is equivalent to Frege's Axiom 2, that no natural number follows after itself in the number-series. It is, of course, essential that Frege's axioms should be intuitive and connected with our ordinary applications of arithmetic: For Frege intends to show that arithmetic is a branch of logic, not that some formal theory which looks something like arithmetic can be developed within something which looks like logic.
The import of the second axiom is, indeed, explained in detail by Frege, in a passage which is worth quoting in full:
The proposition...says that no object which belongs to the number-series beginning with zero follows after itself in the number-series. Instead of this, we can also say: "No finite number follows after itself in the number-series". The importance of this proposition will be made more evident by the following considerations. If we determine the number belonging to a concept (), or, as one normally says, if we count the objects falling under the concept (), then we successively associate these objects with the numberwords from "one" up to a number-word "N", which will be determined by the associating relation's mapping the concept () into the concept "member of the series of numberwords from 'one' to 'N'" and the converse relation's mapping the latter concept into the former. "N" then denotes the sought number; i.e., N is this number. This process of counting may be carried out in various ways, since the associating relation is not completely determined.
The question arises whether, by another choice of this relation, one could reach another number-word 'M'. Then, by our assumptions, M would be the same number as N, but, at the same time, one of these two number-words would follow after the other, e.g., 'N' would follow 'M'. Then N would follow in the number-series after M, which means that it would follow after itself. That is excluded by our proposition concerning finite numbers (Gg I §108).
That is to say: That the result of the process of counting--the number-word one reaches by counting--is well-determined is, according to Frege, a consequence of the fact that no natural number follows after itself. And so, this fact about the natural numbers has a special, and central, role to play in helping us to understand, or in providing a justification for, our ordinary employment of arithmetic. and what he leaves for the reader to infer. Frege never explicitly records mathematical induction as a theorem either, and he can hardly be said to have been oblivious to its import.
Closing
If the foregoing account of Frege's proof of Theorem 263 and its significance is correct, then the evaluation of his work in Grundgesetze must change. For the most part, Grundgesetze has been ignored:
When it has not been ignored, it has usually been dismissed, as if that were more charitable than the alternative, which would be ridicule. 
Tree of Important Theorems in the Proof of Theorem 263
The following is a graphical representation of the dependencies among the main theorems used in Frege That is: It is equivalent to the theorem that the domain can be partitioned into two equinumerous classes each of which is equinumerous with the whole domain. The problematic case is that in which Choice fails, whence the domain can not be well-ordered.
It is, however, easy to prove this theorem in FA+OP: Let F be defined as x[ = (x;0)]; G as x[ = (x;1)]. Plainly, F and G are equinumerous with = and so with each other. Since x(Gx ¬Fx), by the Schröder-Bernstein Theorem (which is provable in second-order logic), ¬F is equinumerous with =.
18. See Theorem 232, to be mentioned below.
19. For proofs of the various theorems concerning the 2-and n-ancestrals, see Appendix II.
20. Note that not all functions intuitively given by induction can be defined in this way. Coupling can not be used to define functions when the recursion equations are of the form:
However, let T; be defined as:
It is not hard to show that ^[T;0,a](,) is functional and satisfies the recursion equations. This is Frege's Theorem 251,. The remainder of the proof consists in the introduction of free variables "A", "D", and "E" for the ordered pairs, which turns out to be exceedingly tedious. 31. Not that this is what Frege had in mind, but this result is the central theorem needed in the proof that an inner model for Fregean Arithmetic is definable in Fregean Arithmetic. The first-order domain consists of the natural numbers, together with Endlos. This result implies that the relativization of Hume's Principle to that domain is a theorem of Fregean Arithmetic, and it is easy to see that the restriction of each instance of comprehension is also a theorem.
32. For, if some natural number precedes zero, then Px0 and = (P)(0,x), whence (P)(0,0). And, if Pxz and Pyz, for natural numbers x, y, z, then, since = (P)(0,x), = (P)(0,y), and P is functional, we have, by Theorem 243, that either (P)(x,y) or (P)(y,x), or x=y. But, if the former, since Pxz, by Theorem 242, = (P)(z,y); and, since Pyz, (P)(y,y). Similarly, if (P)(y,x), then (P)(x,x). Hence x=y.
Conversely, the Dedekind-Peano Axioms imply these. The only one we must prove is (2). We proceed by induction. If (P)(0,0), then, by Frege's Theorem 124, for some x, Px0. Suppose ¬(P)(x,x), x a natural number, and Pxy. Suppose (P)(y,y). Hence, for some z, Pzy and = (P)(y,z). But P is one-one, so z=x.; so = (P)(y,x); but Pxy, so (P)(x,x). Contradiction.
33. I should like to thank George Boolos, Michael Dummett, Mathieu Marion, and Jason Stanley for their advice and criticism.
